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EMPLOYMENT-AT-WILL IN ILLINOIS:
IMPLICATIONS AND ANTICIPATIONS
FOR THE PRACTITIONER
Kalvin M. Grove*
Paul R. Garry**
The doctrine of employment-at-will' has been of longstanding importance
in American empiloyment relationships. The doctrine grew out of the
economic attitude of the Industrial Revolution which encouraged growth,
free enterprise, and entrepreneurship. 2 Under this doctrine, at-will
employers or employees are permitted to terminate employment relation-
ships of no defined duration at any time without incurring any liability.3
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1. An authoritative statement of the employment-at-will rule appears in H. WOOD, A
TREATISE ON THE LAW OF MASTER AND SERVANT § 134, at 272 (1877).
With us the rule is inflexible, that a general or indefinite hiring is prima facie a
hiring at will, and if the servant seeks to make it out a yearly hiring, the burden is
upon him to establish it by proof. A hiring at so much a day, week, month or
year, no time being specified, is an indefinite hiring, and no presumption attaches
that it was for a -day even, but only at the rate fixed for whatever time the party
may serve.
For a comprehensive historical perspective of the at-will rule, see Feinman, The Develop-
iMent of the Employment At Will Rule, 20 AM. J. LEGAL HIST. 118 (1976) (traces the develop-
ment of at-will doctrine vis-a-vis Marxian precepts and control of resource rationale). The
terminable-at-will rule remains the majority rule in this country, and under the rule "the
employer may, without liability, discharge the employee for a good reason, a bad reason, or
no reason at all." Phillips v. Goodyear Tire & Rubber Co., 651 F.2d 1051, 1054 (5th Cir.
1981).
2. For an economic analysis of the history of the at-will doctrine, see Blackburn,
Restricted Employer Discharge Rights: A Changing Concept of Employment At Will, 17 AM.
Bus. L.J. 467 (1980); Blades, Employment At Will vs. Individual Freedom: On Limiting the
Abusive Exercise of Employer Power, 67 COLUM. L. REV. 1404 (1967) [hereinafter cited as
Blades]; Note, Protecting At Will Employees Against Wrongful Discharge: The Duty to Ter-
minate Only in Good Faith, 93 HARV. L. REV. 1816 (1980) [hereinafter cited as Protecting At
Will Employees].
3. See, e.g., Pleasure Driveway & Park Dist. v. Jones, 51 111. App. 3d 182, 367 N.E.2d
111 (3d Dist. 1977) (in absence of contract, neither employer nor employee is compelled to
maintain employment relationship).
The force of the rule is illustrated by circumstances under which discharge has been permit-
ted. See, e.g., Phillips v. Goodyear Tire & Rubber Co., 651 F.2d 1051 (5th Cir. 1981) (no
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Illinois long has recognized the terminable-at-will rule., Although the rule is
still followed by Illinois courts,' the continual erosion of the rule has
diminished the doctrine's effectiveness in providing security for employers.
This Article will review the history and analyze the present state of the
employment-at-will doctrine in Illinois. The focal point of discussion con-
cerns the rise of the tort of retaliatory discharge, which has been increas-
ingly employed by Illinois courts to prevent the terminable-at-will doctrine
from thwarting public policy concerns of the State of Illinois. This Article
will survey the erosion of the employment-at-will rule through public policy
considerations and will suggest means by which practitioners can utilize the
rule in its present form.
HISTORY OF THE EMPLOYMENT-AT-WILL DOCTRINE IN ILLINOIS
In 1896, the Illinois Appellate Court ruled that an employment for a
"long engagement" was no more than employment for an indefinite dura-
tion, and therefore, employers had the right to discharge employees after
giving them the customary notice.6 The court stated that the right to
discharge such an employee belonged to the employer independent of the
employee's competence. Consequently, it was unnecessary for the court to
express any views on the propriety of the discharge.
The attitude which prompted this decision was almost uniformly followed
by the courts in Illinois for the next eighty-one years. During that period
Illinois courts summarily rejected any attempt to limit the employment-at-
will doctrine.' Indeed, it was not until 1977, in Leach v. Lauhoff Grain
Co.9 that even the slightest erosion of the doctrine occurred in the Illinois
courts. This adherence by the courts to the doctrine occurred despite
cause of action in Georgia or Texas for retaliatory discharge where employee was terminated
for giving truthful deposition testimony in antitrust action against employer); Green v.
Amerada-Hess Corp., 612 F.2d 212 (5th Cir.) (federal court declined to decide whether
retaliatory discharge is actionable where discharge was for asserting rights under workers' com-
pensation law), cert. denied, 449 U.S. 952 (1980).
4. See, e.g., Odell v. Chicago Great W. R.R., 212 I11. App. 616 (1st Dist. 1918) (fact that
employee was paid monthly did not sustain burden of proving monthly employment); Gunther
v. Chicago, B. & Q. Ry., 165 Ill. App. 55 (2d Dist. 1911) (in the absence of definite contract
for term of employment, employer may discharge employee at will); Gray v. Wulff, 68 Ill.
App. 376 (2d Dist. 1896) (employee's understanding that his employment was for a "long
engagement" held to be at-will employment).
5. See, e.g., Mann v. Ben Tire Distribs., Ltd., 89 Ill. App. 3d 695, 411 N.E.2d 1235 (4th
Dist. 1980) (memorandum defining annual compensation arrangement insufficient to vitiate at-
will employment relationship); Criscione v. Sears, Roebuck & Co., 66 11. App. 3d 664, 384
N.E.2d 91 (1st Dist. 1978) (at-will employment relationship may be terminated by either
employee or employer, with or without cause); Roemer v. Zurich Ins. Co., 25 Il1. App. 3d 606,
323 N.E.2d 582 (1st Dist. 1975) (accumulation of company benefits insufficient to vitiate at-
will employment relationship).
6. Gray v. Wulff, 68 Ill. App. 376, 378 (2d Dist. 1896).
7. Id.
8. See supra notes 4-5.
9. 51 111. App. 3d 1022, 366 N.E.2d 1145 (4th Dist. 1977) (cause of action for retaliatory
discharge under express wording of Workers' Compensation Act recognized).
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legislative erosion of the doctrine which began slowly in the 1940's, and
which has increased in recent years.10
Long-Standing Predominance of the Employment-At- Will Doctrine
There are several reasons why the rule persisted in Illinois courts for such
an extended period of time. Initially, the at-will theory comported with
economic notions of the late nineteenth and early twentieth centuries. Dur-
ing this period, courts were sympathetic to the doctrine of laissez-faire
economics and convenient legal notions of contract were altered to comport
with that doctrine.1 '
Apparently relying on notions of laissez-faire economics, the Illinois cases
from the early part of this period generally espoused the at-will doctrine
freely without citing to any authority.' 2 This lassez-faire analysis was pro-
pounded as recently as 1981 by the dissenting opinion of Justice Ryan in
Palmateer v. International Harvester Co.'3 Justice Ryan stated that courts
should not focus solely on promoting an employee's expectations when they
depart from the general rule that at-will employment is terminable at the
employer's discretion." He cautioned that courts must recognize that per-
mitting a tort action for retaliatory discharge is an exception to the general
at-will rule and that the legitimate interest of an employer in guiding the
business' policies and destiny must be considered.'" According to Justice
Ryan, one substantial interest to be included in the balancing formula is the
"deteriorating business climate" in Illinois.' 6 Noting that Illinois was not
attracting large amounts of new industry and business and that industry was
leaving the State at an alarming rate, Justice Ryan stated that courts should
decline from adding to the problem by utilizing a vague concept of public
policy. I
10. See infra notes 26-44 and accompanying text.
11. This judicial sympathy for laissez-faire economics, however, did not prevail over time.
In 1954, when the Court in Williamson v. Lee Optical, Inc., 348 U.S. 483 (1955), upheld
Oklahoma's control of the business of selling eyeglasses, a departure from laissez-faire thought
was evident: "The day is gone when this Court uses the Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth
Amendment to strike down state laws, regulatory of business and industrial conditions, be-
cause they may be unwise, improvident, or out of harmony with a particular school of
thought." Id. at 488. The United States Supreme Court has stated that when Congress is regu-
lating the economy, its statutes "are beyond attack without a clear and convincing showing
that there is no rational basis for the legislation; that it is an arbitrary fiat." Carolene Prods.
Co. v. United States, :323 U.S. 18, 31-32 (1944) (citing United States v. Carolene Prods. Co.,
304 U.S. 144 (1937)).
12. See, e.g., Davis v. Fidelity Fire Ins., 208 Ill. 269, 70 N.E. 359 (1904); Odell v. Chicago
G. W. R.R., 212 Ill. App. 616 (1st Dist. 1918); Chadwick v. Morris & Co., 170 Il1. App. 569
(1st Dist. 1912).
13. 85 Il. 2d 124, 421 N.E.2d 876 (1981).
14. Id. at 142-43, 421 N.E.2d at 884 (Ryan, J., dissenting).
15. Id.
16. Id. at 143, 421 N.E.2d at 885.
17. Id. at 145, 421 N.E.2d at 886. Justice Ryan cites Blades, supra note 2, as support for
the notion that the expansion of the right of an employee to sue for wrongful discharge is not
1982]
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Once established,s judicial restraint and respect for precedent prevented
changes in the at-will doctrine even though the repudiation of laissez-faire
economics had begun in the mid-1930's.' 9 Despite increasing activism in the
federal judiciary, the Illinois courts maintained a quiet deference to the
legislature with respect to the employment-at-will doctrine, and continually
reiterated that the duty to create rights belonged to the legislature, not to
the courts.2" Put simply, if the legislature did not provide express civil
remedies, the doctrine of employment-at-will governed because the courts
assumed that civil remedies were intended to be excluded.2 ,
without adverse effect on the employer's business.
[Tihere is the danger that the average jury will identify with, and therefore believe,
the employee. This possibility could give rise to vexatious lawsuits by disgruntled
employees fabricating plausible tales of employer coercion. If the potential for vex-
atious suits by discharged employees is too great, employers will be inhibited in ex-
ercising their best judgment as to which employees should or should not be re-
tained. . . The employer's prerogative to make independent, good faith judg-
ments about employees is important in our free enterprise system.
Id. at 145, 421 N.E.2d at 885 (quoting Blades, supra note 2, at 1428). Thus, for retaliatory
discharge to be actionable, Justice Ryan would require a violation of some "strong public
policy that has been clearly articulated." Id.
18. For a historical analysis of the at-will doctrine with respect to economic considerations,
see generally Blades, supra note 2; Protecting At Will Employees, supra note 2.
19. See supra note 18.
20. See, e.g., Pleasure Driveway & Park Dist. v. Jones, 51 Ill. App. 3d 183, 367 N.E.2d
Ill (3d Dist. 1977). The Jones court cited with approval the decision in Mitchell v. Standolin
Pipe Line Co., 184 F.2d 837 (10th Cir. 1950). The Mitchell court reasoned:
It is not the function of the courts in the absence of a contract to compel a person
to accept or retain another in his employ, not is it the function of courts to compel
any person against his will to remain in the employ of another .... In the absence
of a contract or statutory provision an employer may discharge an employee with-
out cause or reason and owes no duty to continue the employment of an employee.
Id. at 838 (citation omitted). See also Loucks v. Star City Glass Co., 551 F.2d 745 (7th Cir.
1977). As the Loucks court noted, the hesitancy of the courts to infer rights not granted by the
legislature also may have been caused by the activity of the state legislature in developing
statutory exemptions to the employment-at-will doctrine. Id. at 748.
It has been noted that in recognizing a new tort, the judiciary should refrain from encroach-
ing upon the province of the legislature. Chief Justice Marshall stated: "[The judiciary] has no
will in any case. . . . Judicial power is never exercised for the purpose of giving effect to the
will of the judge; always for the purpose of giving effect to the will of the legislature; or in
other words, to the will of the law." Osborne v. Bank of United States, 22 U.S. (9 Wheat.)
738, 866 (1824). This language was cited recently by Justice Underwood in his dissent in Kelsay
v. Motorola Co., 74 I11. 2d 172, 384 N.E.2d 353 (1978). Justice Underwood stated that judicial
restraint is essential to the doctrine of separation of powers. Id. at 191, 384 N.E.2d at 361
(Underwood, J., dissenting). Although this position is not unanimously accepted in Illinois, it
represents the majority view nationally. See Note, Tort Remedy for Retaliatory Discharge: Il-
linois Workmen's Compensation Act Limits Employer's Power to Discharge Terminable-At-
Will-Kelsay v. Motorola, Inc., 29 DEPAUL L. REV. 561 (1980).
21. See, e.g., Teale v. Sears, Roebuck & Co., 66 Ill. 2d 1, 359 N.E.2d 473 (1977) (specific
criminal sanctions provided for in statute precluded civil remedies). See also Loucks v. Star City
Glass Co., 551 F.2d 745 (7th Cir. 1977). The court in Loucks, interpreting Illinois law, deter-
mined that the absence of a provision in the Workmen's Compensation Act creating a private
Vol. 31:359
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An additional reason for the doctrine's persistence is that Illinois courts
received no outside pressure to discard the employment-at-will doctrine.
Notwithstanding some change in the federal judiciary, 2 most state courts
nationwide continued to accept the rule well past the demise of the
economic age from which it was spawned. Then, in 1959, California
recognized a judicial exception to the doctrine, concluding that a cause of
action existed in tort where an employee claimed he was discharged in con-
travention of public policy for his refusal to commit perjury in furtherance
of his employer's interests.23 This limitation of the employment-at-will doc-
trine evolved slowly. In fact, it was not until the middle to late 1970's that
the ranks of states recognizing this public policy tort began to grow." ' The
cause of action for retaliatory discharge was a deliberate policy decision of the Illinois
legislature: "We think it rather unlikely that a retaliatory discharge prohibition would have
been omitted from the comprehensive and integrated legislation if it had been intended." Id. at
748.
22. See infra notes 26-32 and accompanying text.
23. See Petermann v. International Bhd. of Teamsters Local 396, 174 Cal. App. 2d 184,
344 P.2d 25 (1959).
24. See, e.g., Sheets v. Teddy's Frosted Foods, Inc., 179 Conn. 471, 427 A.2d 385 (1980)
(quality control director dismissed for attempting to ensure compliance of company's products
with labeling and licensing laws had a valid cause of action); Frampton v. Central Ind. Gas
Co., 260 Ind. 249, 297 N.E.2d 425 (1973) (employee dismissed for filing workers' compensa-
tion claim had valid cause of action); Murphy v. City of Topeka-Shawnee County Dept. of
Labor Servs., 6 Kan. App. 2d 488, 630 P.2d 186 (1981) (employee discharged for filing
workers' compensation claim had valid cause of action); Adler v. American Standard Corp.
290 Md. 615, 432 A.2d 468 (1981.). (management employee discharged for attempting to "blow
whistle" on corporate malfeasance had valid cause of action); Nees v. Hocks, 272 Or. 210, 536
P.2d 512 (1975) (employee discharged for serving jury duty against employer's directions had
valid cause of action); Harless v. First Nat'l Bank, 246 S.E.2d 270 (W. Va. App. 1978)
(employee discharged for attempting to ensure employer's compliance with consumer credit
laws had valid cause of action).
Some states, although finding for defendant, still have indicated a willingness to recognize
exceptions to the common law rule when the proper facts come before their courts. See, e.g.,
Larsen v. Motor Supply Co., 117 Ariz. 507, 573 P.2d 907 (1977) (discharge of employee for
refusing to take a lie detector test did not violate clear statutory policies); Jackson v. Mindoka
Irrigation Dist., 98 Idaho 330, 563 P.2d 54 (1977) (no evidence that discharge was result of
socially undesirable motive necessary to invoke public policy exception); Abrisz v. Pulley
Freight Lines, Inc., 270 N.W.2d 454 (Iowa Sup. Ct. 1978) (discharge of employee for volun-
tarily writing letter supporting fellow employee's claim for unemployment benefits did not con-
stitute public policy violation); Keneally v. Orgain, 606 P.2d 127 (Mont. Sup. Ct. 1980) (when
public policy is violated, wrongful discharge is actionable); Pierce v. Ortho Pharmaceutical
Corp., 84 N.J. 58, 417 A.2d 505 (1980) (discharge of employee for refusing to test a particular
drug did not justify public policy exception); Geary v. United States Steel Corp., 456 Pa. 171,
319 A.2d 174 (1974) 1discharge of employee for taking unsafe product off market did not
violate clear public policy mandate); Roberts v. Atlantic Richfield Co., 88 Wash. 2d 887, 568
P.2d 764 (1977) (discharge of employee for testifying about allegedly illegal cross-billing system
failed to establish that termination was beyond normal business operations); Ward v. Frito-
Lay, Inc., 95 Wis. 2d 372, 290 N.W.2d 536 (1980) (discharge of employee for violation of
company policy forbidding related employees from working on same shift was business judg-
ment, not public policy violation). Cf. Lampe v. Presbyterian Medical Center, 41 Colo. App.
465, 590 P.2d 513 (1978) (discharge of nurse for refusing to obey nursing code did not violate
public policy).
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Illinois courts, hesitant to carve out new exceptions in the law in this area,
predictably chose to remain with the majority of states retaining the at-will
doctrine.
One additional obstacle which impeded the Illinois courts from embracing
the public policy tort of retaliatory discharge was the definition of "public
policy" itself.2" "Public policy" is an inherently amorphous and ambiguous
entity. Any reliance placed on public policy is subject to severe challenge by
parties and to reversals by higher courts, and to possible ridicule by the
electorate. Consequently, it was understandable that Illinois judges have
been reluctant to recognize a new tort based upon such an uncertain defini-
tion.
Erosion of the Common Law Rule
As intimated, the initial erosion of the employment-at-will doctrine was
primarily the result of statutory impingement, at both the federal and state
levels. Civil or administrative remedies for certain types of discharges,
generally those involving retaliation by the employer, were provided
through express legislative mandate or derived from legislative expressions
of public policy.
On the federal level, statutory erosion began as early as 1935 with the
enactment of the National Labor Relations Act.2 6 Congress subsequently
enacted other protective measures for employees in derogation of the at-will
doctrine. Discharge of "at-will" employees on the basis of their sex,
race, color, religion, national origin,27 age, 2 or in retaliation for the use of
these laws is proscribed. Arbitrary discharge of employees who are return-
ing veterans,29 civil servants,30 or those who have had their wages
25. Justice Simon in Palmateer v. International Harvester Co., 85 Ill. 2d 124, 421 N.E.2d
876 (1981), noted:
There is no precise definition of the term. In general, it can be said that public
policy concerns what is right and just and what affects the citizens of the State
collectively. It is found in the State's constitution and statutes and when they are
silent, in its judicial decisions.
Id. at 130, 421 N.E.2d at 878 (citations omitted). See also People ex rel. Nelson v. Wiersema
State Bank, 361 I11. 75, 86, 197 N.E. 537, 542 (1945) (defines public policy as any act that
tends to injure the public welfare).
26. 29 U.S.C. §§ 151-168 (1976). The National Labor Relations Act provides protection
from all types of employer and union retaliation against employees who are engaged in "pro-
tected concerted activity" to improve their wages or working conditions or employees who
choose not to engage in such activity. Moreover, Congress established a full scale adminis-
trative mechanism, the National Labor Relations Board, which in theory was aimed at expedit-
ing the employee claims of retaliation or harrassment emanating from an employee's exercise
of protected concerted activity. Id. § 153.
27. The Civil Rights Act of 1964, 42 U.S.C. §§ 2000e-2(a) to 2(d) (1976).
28. Age Discrimination in Employment Act of 1967, 29 U.S.C. §§ 623(a)-(f) (1976 & Supp.
II 1980).
29. Vietnam Era Veterans' Readjustment Assistance Act of 1974, 38 U.S.C. § 2024(c)(A)
(1976 & Supp. IV 1980).
30. Civil Service Act, 5 U.S.C. § 7501 (1976).
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garnished,3" also is prohibited.12
The Illinois legislature began to erode the at-will doctrine at about the
same time the federal erosion began. In 1941, the Servicemen's Employment
Tenure Act" was enacted. Under the act, employers were prohibited from
discharging a veteran without cause within one year from the veteran's re-
turn to a job held prior to military service.3 ' In 1961, the Fair Employment
Practices Act,3" which provided sanctions for various discriminatory dis-
charges, including discrimination on the basis of race, color, religion,
national origin, or ancestry, became law.36 The Act eventually was repealed
and incorporated into the Human Rights Act of 1980."
In the 1970's, the erosion of the at-will doctrine continued with the adoption
of the new Illinois Constitution. Article I, section 17, prohibited discrimina-
tion on the basis of race, color, creed, natural ancestry, or sex in an
employer's hiring and promotion practices. 8 This constitutional provision
31. Consumer Credit Protection Act of 1969, 15 U.S.C. § 1674(a) (1976).
32. For a more detailed discussion of federal law erosion of the at-will doctrine, see Note,
Job Security for the At Will Employee: Contractual Right of Discharge for Cause; Toussaint
v. Blue Cross & Blue Shield of Michigan, 57 CHI.[-]KENT L. REV. 697, 707 (1981) [hereinafter
cited as Job Security].
33. ILL. REV. STAT. ch. 126Y2, § 32 (1981).
34. Id.
35. 1961 Ill. Laws 1845, repealed by Illinois Human Rights Act, P.A. 81-1216, § 10-108,
1979 111. Laws 4854 (codified as amended at ILL. REV. STAT. ch. 68, §§ 1-101 to 9-102 (1981)).
See infra note 42.
36. Section 3, 1961 Il. Laws 1845 (repealed 1979). Such discrimination also was declared to
be against the public policy in Illinois. Id. § 1. In 1975, two additional prohibitions were added.
First, mental or physical handicap discrimination was prohibited where the handicap was not
related to ability to perform the job. Act of July 11, 1975, P.A. 79-186, § 1, 1975 111. Laws
1378 (repealed 1979).
Second, discrimination in employment on the basis of unfavorable discharge from military
service was outlawed. Act of Aug. 10, 1975, P.A. 79-370, § 1, 1975 II1. Laws 1378 (repealed
1979).
37. ILL. REV. STAT. ch. 68, §§ 1-101 to 9-102 (1981). See infra note 42.
38. ILL. CONST. art. I, § 17 (1970). Section 17 provides in pertinent part:
All persons shall have the right to be free from discrimination on the basis of race,
color, creed, national ancestry and sex in the hiring and promotion practices of
any employer or in the sale or rental of property.
These rights are enforceable without action by the General Assembly, but the
General Assembly by law may establish reasonable exemptions relating to these
rights and provide additional remedies for their violation.
Id. (emphasis added).
Although not specifically stated within § 17, lower Illinois courts have ruled that a cause of
action for discriminatory discharge is implied within the terms of the provision. See, e.g.,
Butler v. Fiat Allis, No. 805-78 (Sangamon County Sept. 11, 1979) (order denying motion to
dismiss because § 17 not limited to hiring and promotion); Briggs v. Lawrenceville Indus., No.
78-L-6 (Jasper County Feb. 1979) (order denying motion to dismiss because § 17 not limited to
hiring and promotion). However, the continuing use of this constitutional provision as a shield
against at-will discharges recently has been dealt a significant blow by the decision of the
Fourth District Appellate Court in Greenholdt v. Illinois Bell Tel. Co., 107 IlI. App. 3d 748,
438 N.E.2d 245 (4th Dist. 1982). In Greenholdt, the court rejected the notion that § 17
established a claim for discriminatory discharge. Looking to the plain words of the statute, the
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was followed by a series of legislative enactments that further circumscribe
the employer's right to discharge an employee-at-will. For instance, the
1975 amendment to the Workers' Compensation Act specifically prohibits
any retaliatory action taken against an employee filing a claim under the
Act." Such retaliation was determined to be against the public policy of Il-
linois. Another Illinois statute expressly prohibits an employer from
discharging an employee because his wages were garnished. 0 Under a 1977
statute, it became unlawful to discharge an employee because his earnings
were subject to wage garnishment demands on his employer.41 The Human
Rights Act,' which was enacted in 1980, replaced, inter alia, the Fair
Employment Practices Act,' 3 and the Age Discrimination Act."
court concluded that "article I, section 17, extends to hiring and promotion practices but not
to all employment practices." Id. at 752, 438 N.E.2d at 248.
To the extent that article 1, § 17 can be used, it is a potent weapon. Unlike other employ-
ment discrimination provisions, a claim under article I, § 17 of the Illinois Constitution may
seek both compensatory and punitive damages. See Walinski v. Morrison & Morrison, 60 Il.
App. 3d 616, 377 N.E.2d 242 (1st Dist. 1978). For an in-depth analysis of the Walinski deci-
sion, see Note, State Constitutional Right to Damages for Private Discrimination in Employ-
ment-Walinski v. Morrison & Morrison, 28 DEPAUL L. REv. 229 (1978).
39. ILL. REV. STAT. ch. 48, § 138.4(h) (1981). The Act makes it "unlawful for any
employer . . . to discharge or threaten to discharge . . . an employee because of the exercise of
his rights or remedies granted to him by this Act." Id.
40. ILL. REV. STAT. ch. 62, § 88 (1981). This statute protects the employee whose wages are
involuntarily garnished (to be recodified at ILL. REV. STAT. ch. 110, § 12-818).
41. ILL. REV. STAT. ch. 48, § 39.11 (1981). This statute protects the employee who
voluntarily assigns his wages to a creditor.
42. ILL. REV. STAT. ch. 68, §§ 1-101 to 9-102 (1981). The Human Rights Act declares that
certain discriminatory actions by employers, employment agencies, and labor organizations
constitute civil rights violations. Id. § 2-102. Discrimination based on race, color, national
origin, ancestry, age, marital status, handicap, or unfavorable discharge from military service
is prohibited. Id. § 1-103(Q). Not only did the legislature seek to consolidate all discrimination
provisions in Illinois law, but the Act also was designed to develop a uniform and comprehen-
sive legislative framework to handle all types of discrimination. As Representative Gene
Barnes, one of the co-sponsors of the bill in the Illinois House of Representatives, stated: "For
the first time, with the adoption of this legislation, there will be one central place, one central
agency, one structure for those persons to go to have their grievance affirmed or to . . . have
that grievance denied." TRANSCRIPT OF THE ILLINOIS HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES DEBATE IN
GENERAL ASSEMBLY ON SENATE BILL 1377, June 25, 1979, at 89 (emphasis added). This senti-
ment was echoed by a sponsor of the Human Rights Act, then State Senator Harold
Washington:
What has happened here and I think it's a wise move, that we have merged . . . at-
tempted to merge these various disciplines. We bring together the Fair Employment
Practice Commission, EEO, Human Relations. We deal with public accommoda-
tions with financial credit, with housing with the brokering laws. We remove the
brokerage laws out of the criminal court where they should never have been and
placed them under this Act to make it a negotiational thing. We deal with public
accommodations, not as a crime, but as something that should be negotiated and
discussed. We cover the entire purview of the law.
TRANSCRIPT OF ILLINOIS STATE DEBATE IN THE GENERAL ASSEMBLY ON SENATE BILL 1377, May
25, 1979, at 284 (emphasis added).
43. 1961 Ill. Law 1845, repealed by Illinois Human Rights Act, P.A. 81-1216, § 10-108,
1979 IlI. Laws 4854.
44. § 4, 1967 Ill. Laws 2044, repealed by Illinois Human Rights Act, P.A. 81-1216, § 10-108,
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Adoption of the Public Policy Tort in Illinois
In 1977, the Illinois courts began to join their legislative brethren in chip-
ping away at the employment-at-will doctrine through the recognition of an
action in tort'5 when an employee is discharged in contravention of Illinois
"public policy." In Leach v. Lauhoff Grain Co.,"1 an Illinois appellate
court permitted a cause of action for retaliatory discharge under the
Workers' Compensation Act' 7 based upon public policy considerations. In
establishing the cause of action, the court relied upon the legislative intent
embodied in that Act which suggested that the purpose of the Act was to
prohibit an employer from discharging an employee for exercising rights or
remedies guaranteed by the Act.4" The court, however, took great pains to
limit the decision's precedential impact.' 9 First, the court narrowed the
definition of public policy to include only those policies actually embodied
in the language of the Illinois Constitution or Illinois statutes. Second,
public policy was not to be derived from the decisions of Illinois courts
unless the constitution and Illinois statutory law were silent on the subject."0
Third, the court reinforced its general adherence to the at-will doctrine ex-
cept in those situations where a clear mandate of public policy was involved. 5
Despite the decision's limited scope, the Leach court laid the initial ground-
work for further expansion of the tort exception to the terminable-at-will
doctrine.
The next significant expansion of the tort of retaliatory discharge occurred in
Kelsay v. Motorola Co.52 Although Kelsay involved the same statute as
Leach, the express statutory declaration of Illinois public policy which was
vital to the Leach court's rationale was not integral to the Kelsay decision
because the claim in Kelsay arose before the prohibition against retaliatory
discharge was added to the Workers' Compensation Act in 1975. Instead,
1979 Ill. Laws 4854. The Act also had a criminal counterpart that had prescribed nonfelonious
sanctions for discharge based on physical or mental handicap not related to job performanre.
Equal Opportunity for the Handicapped Act, P.A. 77-1211, § 3, 1971 Ill. Laws 2169, repealed
by Illinois Human Rights Act, P.A. 81-1216, § 10-108, 1979 111. Laws 4854.
45. Illinois has recently recognized a cause of action for employees at-will under a contract
theory. See infra notes 57-67 and accompanying text.
46. 51 111. App. 3d 1022, 366 N.E.2d 1145 (4th Dist. 1977).
47. ILL. REV. STAT. ch. 48, § 138 (1981).
48. In 1975, the Workers' Compensation Act was amended to add:
It shall be unlawful for any employer, individually or through any insurance com-
pany or service adjustment company, to discharge or to threaten to discharge or to
refuse to rehire or recall to active service in a suitable capacity an employee
because of the exercise of his rights or remedies granted to him by this Act.
Id., § 138.4(h) (amending ILL. REV. STAT. ch. 48, § 138.4 (1975)).
49. Due to the express statutory policy involved, the actual holding of the case did no more
than recognize a tort for retaliatory discharge where an express prohibition against such
discharge appears in a statute. 51 111. App. 3d at 1026, 366 N.E.2d at 1148.
50. Id. at 1024, 366 N.E.2d at 1147.
51. Id. at 1026, 366 N.E.2d at 1148.
52. 74 IlI. 2d 172, 384 N.E.2d 353 (1978).
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the Illinois Supreme Court permitted the claim solely because it found an
implicit expression of public policy against retaliation for the exercise of
rights granted under the Act because of the Act's "humane" and "remedial
nature," its "beneficient purpose," and its provisions for "efficient
remedies for and protection of the employees." '5 3 Because the Kelsay court's
holding was based solely upon a public policy inference as opposed to an
express statutory enunciation, the decision dramatically expanded the means
by which public policy could be discerned to support a claim for retaliatory
discharge' Although Kelsay still required statutory support, Kelsay's public
policy inference which derived from the mere existence of a particular
statute, invited further expansion-to infer similar public policies from
judicial precedent or from a statutory scheme.
The most recent departure from the common law terminable-at-will doc-
trine in Illinois occurred in Palmateer v. International Harvester Co.5"
Palmateer involved a discharge in retaliation for "whistle-blowing." An
employee, who suspected a coworker of violating the Illinois criminal code,
notified a law enforcement agency and offered to assist in the investigation
of the suspected malfeasance. In declaring the existence of a cause of action
for retaliatory discharge, the Illinois Supreme Court, as invited by Kelsay,
continued to relax its reliance upon an express statutory_mandate. Without
relying upon specific legislation of any kind, the court ascertained that a
public policy against discouraging a citizen's participation in the enforce-
ment of the criminal laws was inherent in the criminal code.56 As a result,
Palmateer further broadened the means by which a public policy basis to
support a claim for retaliatory discharge could be discerned.
In summary, evolution of the public policy tort in Illinois has progressed
beyond the limited recognition of a cause of action supported by a clear
and express statutory mandate. In Illinois, public policy support for a
retaliatory discharge suit may be claimed from an express constitutional and
statutory mandate, inferred from implicit statutory expressions of public
policy, or discerned from a notion that the synthesis of a body of law re-
quires that employees engaged in particular acts for the public welfare be
protected.
CONTRACTUAL RIGHTS UNDER THE AT-WILL RULE
Wholly apart from the public policy discharge tort, Illinois courts have
53. Id. at 181-82, 384 N.E.2d at 357.
54. 85 Il. 2d 124, 421 N.E.2d 876 (1981).
55. Id. at 127, 421 N.E.2d at 877.
56. Id. at 132, 421 N.E.2d at 879. The Palmateer court recognized the existence of a clear
public policy favoring investigation and prosecution of criminal offenses: "There is no public
policy more basic, nothing more implicit in the concept of ordered liberty, than the enforce-
ment of a State's criminal code. There is no public policy more important or more funda-
mental than the one favoring the effective protection of the lives and property of citizens." Id.
(citations omitted). Therefore, even though there was no specific constitutional or statutory
provision requiring a citizen to take an active part in discovery, investigation, and prosecution
of crime, the Palmateer court determined that public policy favored citizen crime fighters.
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recently established a cause of action for employees at-will under a contract
theory. 7 In Martin v. Federal Life Insurance Company,"6 an Illinois Appel-
late Court held that an employee has a claim to enforce an oral contract
against an employer where the employee alleges that he has provided some
specific consideration to the employer in return for the employer's agree-
ment to employ him until such time as he decides to retire. In 1967, the
employee, Martin, agreed not to accept a job offer with a rival company in
return for his employer's assurances that Martin could continue working for
the employer until such time as he retired. In February, 1977, Martin was
terminated allegedly without cause. In finding that Martin had a cause of
action for breach of contract the court held that "we believe that when the
employer gives up another offer in exchange for and in reliance upon the
employer's promise of permanent employment, that contract, if proved is
enforceable.' 9 The court left open the question as to whether additional
consideration, such as the agreement Martin made to forego a specific job
offer, is always necessary to enforce an oral contract for lifetime employ-
ment or whether a contract for permanent employment is made whenever
an employer and employee agree that the employee will be retained perma-
nently so long as the employee performs his present job competently. In-
stead, the court only notes that the notion of requiring additional con-
sideration from the employee, above and beyond the mere agreement to
provide competent job performance, may be viewed as "useful" in certain
cases where the employee provides no evidence of a contract for permanent
employment other than a statement by his employer that he would be
employed for life."0
In reaching its decision, the Martin court rejected any notion that the
oral contract which was made between the employer and employee was bar-
red by the Statute of Frauds,6 even though 10 years had elapsed between
the date of the representation and the discharge. The Statute of Frauds pro-
hibits oral contracts which cannot be performed within the space of one
year from the making thereof. The Martin court held that the test to deter-
mine whether the Statute of Frauds is applicable in this particular instance
was to determine "whether the contract by its terms is capable of full per-
formance within a year, not whether such an occurrence is likely." 6 By
constructing the test in this manner, the court was able to hold that despite
the ten-year interval the Statute of Frauds did not apply. Noting that the
agreement between the employee, Martin and his employer provided that
Martin would be employed "until his retirement" the court ruled that the
contract could have been fully performed within the one year time period. 63
57. - Ill. App. 3d __, 440 N.E.2d 998 (lst Dist. 1982).
58. Id.
59. Id. at __, 440 N.E.2d at 1004.
60. Id. at __,440 N.E.2d at 1003.
61. ILL. REV. STAT. ch. 59, § 1 (1979).
62. - Il. App. 3d at __, 440 N.E.2d at 1004.
63. The court, although holding that the Statute of Frauds was not applicable for the
above noted reasons, also reinforced the notion that the Statute of Frauds would not be inap-
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Interestingly enough, while the Martin court upheld a cause of action for
breach of contract in Illinois, the court rejected any notion of a cause of
action grounded in a breach of the covenant of good faith and fair
dealing.64 In rejecting such a claim, the court noted that "[care must be
taken to prevent the transmutation of every breach of contract into an inde-
pendent tort action through the bootstrapping of the general contract prin-
ciple of good faith and fair dealing. We conclude that existing principles of
tort law are adequate without our creating a new action based on a vague
notion of fair dealing. ' 65
plicable in instances where a contract could not be performed within one year, absent the death
of one of the parties. - Ill. App. 3d at __ , 440 N.E.2d at 1005. However, the court must
only have been speaking of contracts which talk of a specific durational period because the
court went on to rule, citing Sinclair v. Sullivan Chevrolet Co., 45 Ill. App. 2d 10, 195 N.E.2d
250, aff'd, 31 111. 2d 507, 202 N.E.2d 516 (1964), that "where a contract extends to a point in
time, be it death or some other circumstance, at which time the full service contemplated will
have been rendered, and that point in time could occur within one year, the Statute of Frauds
will not be a bar to the enforcement of the action." - Ill. App. 3d at -_, 440 N.E.2d at
1005.
64. A contract action or an action based upon breach of an implied covenant of good faith
has been accepted in at least two states. In the first such decision, Monge v. Beebe Rubber
Co., 114 N.H. 130, 316 A.2d 549 (1974), the Supreme Court of New Hampshire held that ter-
mination of an at-will employment contract constituted a breach because the discharge was
motivated by bad faith, malice, or retaliation. Id. at 133, 316 A.2d at 551. Such termination
was not considered in the best interests of the economic system or the public good. The Monge
decision was based upon the principle that all contracts impliedly contain an obligation of
good faith. Id. In Fortune v. National Cash Register Co., 373 Mass. 96, 364 N.E.2d 1251
(1977), and Gram v. Liberty Mutual Insurance Co., - Mass. - , 429 N.E.2d 21 (1981),
the Massachusetts Supreme Judicial Court adopted the Monge reasoning. The court held that
where an improperly motivated principal seeks to deprive its agent of all compensation by ter-
minating the contractual relationship when the agent has nearly completed a successful sale,
the principal has acted in bad faith and a breach of contract is effected, notwithstanding that
the employment is of indefinite duration. Id. at - , 429 N.E.2d at 29; 373 Mass. at 104, 364
N.E.2d at 1257.
In Fortune, discharge prevented the employee from receiving earned commissions. The court
held that this action was in bad faith and therefore in breach of his terminable-at-will employ-
ment contract. In adopting Monge, the court stated:
We believe that the holding in the Monge case merely extends to employment con-
tracts the rule that " 'in every contract there is an implied covenant that neither
party shall do anything which will have the effect of destroying or injuring the
right of the other party to receive the fruits of the contract, which means that in
every contract there exists an implied covenant of good faith and fair dealing .....
Id. (citations omitted) (emphasis in original).
In a third state, Michigan, although there is no overriding covenant of good faith, if an
employer makes any written or oral representations to the effect that the employee will main-
tain his or her job as long as the employee continues to perform adequately, courts will ad-
judge a contract terminable only if just cause is found. See Toussaint v. Blue Cross & Blue
Shield, 408 Mich. 579, 292 N.W.2d 880 (1980) (employer's personnel manual representing com-
pany policy of requiring just cause for termination bound employer to that policy in his
employment-at-will contract with employee). See also Weiner v. McGraw Hill, Inc., No. 485,
slip op. (N.Y. 1982) (employer's assurances in employment application and manual is sufficient
to protect employee from discharge without cause).
65. __ Il. App. 2d - , 440 N.E.2d 1006. Finally, the court rejected the notion that an
employee of the employer could be charged with tortious interference with contract absent an
allegation of conduct which indicates that the employer's actions were willful and malicious.
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The import of Martin is that employees in Illinois now have a cause of
action for breach of contract regardless of any public policy violations, the
time interval between the date of the representation and the date of their
termination, or the fact that the contract was completely oral. As long as
the plaintiff-employee alleges and proves consideration of some type above
the normal agreement to perform his work competently, the teaching of
Martin is that an employer who has given assurances of permanent employ-
ment, may be liable in contract, absent a showing of just cause termination.
In addition to Martin, there is another cause of action recognized in Il-
linois that has grown out of the same factual context-oral assurances given
by the employer-and which serves to limit the at-will doctrine. In Gilliland
v. Allstate Insurance Company," the court indicated that an employee, who
was allegedly told at the time he was hired that as long as he substantially
complied with the company's discretions would be employed until retire-
ment and receive the benefits of the profit sharing pension and savings
plans, would have a claim for tortious misrepresentation upon his termina-
tion without cause.
Not only did the court indicate that such a cause of action was viable,
but held that the cause of action would be effective no matter how much
time separated the alleged misrepresentation and termination. The court
specifically held that the statute of limitations covering the tort of misrepre-
sentation would not start to run until the injury caused by the tort occurred
-the time of termination.6 7 Based on Gilliland, the representation at issue
could be ten, even twenty years old by the time the termination took place,
yet the cause of action would be timely.
Both the misrepresentation and the contract claims are potent weapons
because they can resurrect long past representations as a basis for recovery.
A Gilliland claim, however, may be more effective than Martin because the
plaintiff need not demonstrate that consideration was given for the state-
ment of the employer. Moreover, because the Gilliland cause of action
sounds in tort, the plaintiff may seek both compensatory and punitive
damages. In contrast, because Martin is based on a contract theory, plain-
tiff would be limited to the recovery of compensatory damages.
FUTURE FORM OF THE AT-WILL DOCTRINE IN ILLINOIS
Although the common law terminable-at-will rule is still respected, recent
Illinois decisions, which have expanded the scope of the public policy tort,
have led to the continued erosion of the rule. Moreover, by continuing to
broaden the definition of public policy as the Illinois courts have done in
the transition from Leach to Palmateer, Illinois courts can, and probably
will, continue to erode the at-will doctrine. The extent to which the Illinois
courts will expand the definition of "public policy" and, consequently, in-
crease the availability of the tort of retaliatory discharge, is uncertain. One
66. 69 Ill. App. 3d 630, 388 N.E.2d 68 (Ist Dist. 1979).
67. Id. at 634, 388 N.E.2d at 71.
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can glean, however, some indication of where Illinois courts will find public
policy to exist in the near future.
First, decisions in other states provide guidance as to when Illinois might
recognize a claim for retaliatory discharge. The Illinois Supreme Court
tends to seek support for its decisions by reviewing the status of the public
policy tort in other states.68 Consequently, if an employee was discharged in
retaliation for fulfilling a jury duty obligation, Illinois courts might look to
the case law of other jurisdictions 9 and determine that a cause of action for
retaliatory discharge should be permitted in Illinois. Similarly, cases in
other jurisdictions concerning a discharge for refusal to accede to the sexual
advances of a superior,'" a discharge of an employee for refusing to commit
perjury," and a discharge of an employee for attempting to ensure
employer compliance with the law,72 presumably might provide a public
policy basis to support a cause of action for retaliatory discharge.
The likelihood that the Illinois Supreme Court would accept these claims
as actionable stems not only from the fact that these dismissals justified
actions for retaliatory discharge in other jurisdictions, but also because the
court readily could find that each of these instances generates a situation
which is injurious both to the specific employee and to the public.73 The
probability that Illinois may adopt any or all of these expansions of the
retaliatory discharge tort also is greater in view of Illinois' gradual expan-
sion of the sources from which a public policy basis can be derived to sup-
port a claim for retaliatory discharge. Such support may range from an ex-
press legislative mandate to a more generalized inference of public policy
emanating from a legislative "scheme".
The public policy exemption also may be expanded in Illinois if courts
utilize established expressions of public policy and apply such established
policies to other employees who were tangentially involved. For example,
under the Illinois Workers' Compensation Act," the cause of action for
retaliatory discharge logically could be expanded to provide a remedy not
only for the employee seeking compensation, but also for an employee who
testified on behalf of another employee in a workers' compensation suit.7"
68. See, e.g.. Palmateer v. International Harvester Co., 85 I1. 2d 124, 131, 421 N.E.2d
876, 879 (1981).
69. See Nees v. Hocks, 272 Or. 210, 536 P.2d 512 (1975) (court looked to case law of
several jurisdictions in holding that a cause of action existed for discharge in retaliation for
serving on a jury).
70. See Monge v. Beebe Rubber Co., 114 N.H. 130, 316 A.2d 549 (1974).
71. See Petermann v. International Bhd. of Teamsters Local 396, 174 Cal. App. 2d 184,
344 P.2d 25 (1959).
72. See Sheets v. Teddy's Frosted Foods, Inc., 179 Conn. 471, 427 A.2d 385 (1980).
73. See People ex rel. Peabody v. Chicago Gas Trust Co., 130 Ill. 268, 294, 22 N.E.2d 798,
803 (1889).
74. ILL. REv. STAT. ch. 48, § 138 (1981). See supra notes 46-51 and accompanying text.
75. The ability of the courts to analogize public policy will be tempered to some extent by
the countervailing concern that a legislative failure to create a right or remedy was purposeful.
In each particular case the court will have to weigh carefully whether such exclusion of a right
Vol. 31:359
1982] EMPL 0 YMENT-A T- WILL
Although the expansion of the public policy exception will continue, re-
cent court decisions in Illinois and in other states indicate that there are
distinct limitations to the public policy exception and that the at-will doc-
trine still is viable. Significantly, the Illinois Supreme Court has noted that
the public policy tort in the retaliatory discharge context generally is defined
in other jurisdictions as striking at the heart of a citizen's social rights,
duties, and responsibilities. Thus, discharges for private reasons, even if
for such non-job related reasons as personal animosity, would appear to be
protected by the at-will doctrine despite the expanding public policy excep-
tion. " Moreover, even where a perceived public policy is present, Illinois
courts are less likely to permit a further cause of action for retaliatory
discharge if the particular statute involved already has provided a remedy. 8
A final limitation to the exception may arise because several states are
pulling away from the broad use of inferring public policy set forth in
Palmateer 9 This may restrain the expansion of the exception in Illinois
courts because of the continuing tendency of the Illinois Supreme Court, in
recognizing the tort of retaliatory discharge, to examine the holdings of
other states that previously have confronted a similar cause of action."
As to other infringements on the at-will doctrine, the recent Martin case
indicates that Illinois courts are beginning to recognize that in addition to
public policy tort, other causes of action for loss of employment may very
well lie. Indeed, the future of the Martin cause of action is probably less
was intended. Indeed, this very concern has thwarted the expansion of the public policy theory
in several states. See, e.g., Larson v. Motor Supply Co., 117 Ariz. 507, 573 P.2d 907 (1977)
(noting an absence of statutory remedies, court refused to extend public policy exception to
employee discharged for forcing his employer to take an unsafe product off the market);
Abrisz v. Pulley Freight Lines, 270 N.W.2d 454 (Iowa 1978) (noting an absence of statutory
remedies, court refused to extend the public policy exception to an employee discharged
ostensibly for writing a letter which supported former employee's claim for unemployment
compensation).
76. See Palmateer v. International Harvester Co., 85 Ill. 2d 124, 130, 421 N.E.2d 876,
878-79 (1981).
77. See Criscione v. Sears, Roebuck & Co., 66 Ill. App. 3d 664, 384 N.E.2d 91 (1st Dist.
1978) (lack of legitimate business reasons for discharge was not tantamount to a violation of
public policy).
78. See, e.g., Teale v. Sears, Roebuck & Co., 66 Ill. 2d 1, 359 N.E.2d 473 (1977) (Illinois
Supreme Court declined to expand judicial remedies where statute in question provided for
protection of rights).
79. See, e.g., Abrisz v. Pulley Freight Lines, 270 N.W.2d 454 (Iowa 1978) (public policy
tort acknowledged, but not applied to facts in which employee dismissed for voluntarily
writing letter in support of fellow employee's unemployment benefit claim); Pierce v. Ortho
Pharmaceutical Corp., 84 N.J. 58, 417 A.2d 505 (1980) (public policy tort acknowledged, but
not applied to facts in which employee dismissed for refusing to test a particular drug); Bender
Ship Repair, Inc. v. Stevens, 379 So. 2d 594 (Ala. 1980) (public policy tort recognized, but not
applied to facts in which employee dismissed for serving on a grand jury).
80. See Palmateer v. International Harvester Co., 85 Ill. 2d 124, 421 N.E.2d 876 (1981)
(court used decisions of several other states to support its holding); Kelsay v. Motorola Co., 74
Ill. 2d 172, 384 N.E.2d 353 (1978) (court used case law of two other states to support its
holding).
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limited than the public policy tort. The potential is that Illinois courts
could easily expand the cause of action enunciated in Martin by reducing
the consideration requirements and by permitting plaintiffs to point to more
generalized statements of employment policy such as those that may be con-
tained in a personnel policy manual distributed to the employees as the
basic promise which underlies the contract.
Additionally, it is probable that oral representations of permanent
employment or no discharge without cause will be utilized more frequently
in establishing claims of misrepresentation in employment contexts. Misrep-
resentation claims such as the one raised in Gilliland v. Allstate Insurance
Company, will be an increasingly attractive pleading as it can be proven
without any showing of consideration and permits the employee to seek
punitive damages.
IMPLICATIONS FOR THE PRACTITIONER
This section provides practical guidance for the practitioner representing
either the employer or the at-will employee who is alleging wrongful dis-
charge. Practical suggestions are important because punitive damages may
be imposed upon an employer who is found to have wrongly terminated
employees whom the employer believed were at-will.' The function of
punitive damages is to punish wrongdoers and to deter future offenses. In
both Kelsay82 and Palmateer,83 the Illinois Supreme Court cautioned that
punitive damages properly may be awarded in future retaliatory discharge
cases. Punitive damages were not awarded in those cases because the court
considered such an award unfair for a novel cause of action.8" The excuse
81. See D. DOBBS, REMEDIES § 3.9 (1973); RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 908 com-
ment a (1973); Williams, The Aims of the Law of Tort, 4 CURRENT LEGAL PROBS. 137 (1951).
82. 74 I11. 2d at 189, 384 N.E.2d at 361.
83. 85 Il. 2d at 135, 421 N.E.2d at 881.
84. See Palmateer, 85 II1. 2d at 134-35, 421 N.E.2d at 881; Kelsay, 74 Ill. 2d at 188-89, 384
N.E.2d at 360-61. The Kelsay court's discussion of punitive damages included the following
analysis:
Because of their penal nature, punitive damages are not favored in the law, and
the courts must take caution to see that punitive damages are not improperly or
unwisely awarded. Adherence to this rule compels us to conclude that punitive
damages should not be awarded where, as here, the cause of action forming the
basis of their award is a novel one.
74 Ill. 2d at 188, 384 N.E.2d at 360 (citations omitted) (emphasis added).
The Palmateer court held that the issue of punitive damages was controlled by the Kelsay
decision.
In order to treat like situations alike, we believe it is fair to dispose of the prayer
for punitive damages in this case in the same manner as punitive damages were
treated in Kelsay. As already noted, this court set aside the punitive damage
award, directing that, in cases involving the tort of retaliatory discharge, punitive
damages would be allowed only in future cases. The plaintiff was discharged 14
months before the filing of this court's opinion in Kelsay. Therefore, to be consis-
tent with the holding in Kelsay, punitive damages should not be awarded here.
85 111. 2d at 134-35, 421 N.E.2d at 881.
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of novelty no longer exists, however, as the courts seek to deter wrongful
discharges in the future.
Preventive Measures for Employers
An awareness of the potential consequences of a disputed termination
should begin at hiring and should continue throughout the employment
relationship. Although no employer can be assured full immunity from
viable lawsuits, the employer should at least recognize the more obvious
situations which could generate potential liability and establish methods to
prevent them. Significant areas from which potential liability may arise in-
clude: the content of the job application and employee manual; representa-
tions made during the interviewing process; and improper circumstances
surrounding the termination of employment.
If an employer desires to maintain a practice of hiring at-will employees,
an employer must be careful that neither his acts nor words transform a ter-
minable-at-will relationship into employment for a specific duration. Initially,
express language to that effect should be incorporated in the job application
form. In Novosel v. Sears, Roebuck & Co.,85 a Michigan district court ad-
dressed the challenged validity of a clause on a job application which
described any potential employment as at-will. 6 In sustaining the validity of
the clause, the court cited to the language of the Michigan Supreme Court
in Toussaint v. Blue Cross & Blue Shield.8" The Toussaint court stated that
where an employer did not agree to guarantee job security, it could protect
itself by entering into a written contract which expressly provides that the
employee's term of service is determined by the pleasure or will of the
employer.88 Consequently, even though it is not necessary under Illinois law
at present, it is to the employer's advantage to clearly state in the job ap-
plication that the employment is at-will.
The job interview is another crucial point in defining the terms of
employment and avoiding any challenge to the at-will status of the
employee. Verbal definition of the employment relation as at-will should
85. 495 F. Supp. 344 (E.D. Mich. 1980).
86. The job application set forth the following:
I certify that the information contained in this application is correct to the best of
my knowledge and understand that falsification of this information is grounds for
dismissal in accordance with Sears, Roebuck and Co. policy .... In consideration
of my employment, I agree to conform to the rules and regulations of Sears,
Roebuck and Co., and my employment and compensation can be terminated, with
or without cause, and with or without notice, at any time, at the option of either
the Company or myself. I understand that no store manager or representative of
Sears, Roebuck and Co., other than the president or vice president of the Com-
pany, has any authority to enter into any agreement for employment for any
specified period of time, or to make any agreement contrary to the foregoing.
Id. at 346 (emphasis in original).
87. 408 Mich. 579, 292 N.W.2d 880 (1980).
88. Id. at 612 n.24, 292 N.W.2d at 891 n.24.
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help alleviate potential ambiguity. The importance of an accurate portrayal
of the employment relationship in the hiring process is heightened by the
fact that representations made by an interviewer later may either give rise to
a possible Toussaint89 claim that termination may only be for just cause or
appear as grounds for a misrepresentation action. Misrepresentation is
available to terminated at-will employees as an alternative cause of action to
a retaliatory discharge. Even where the discharge of an at-will employee
does not violate public policy, the former employee may be able to recover
on the theory that his termination was contrary to representations made to
him at the outset of his employment.9" Inadvertent remarks by an inter-
viewer, such as "one generally is not dismissed without good cause," may
transform an otherwise at-will employment into an actionable claim. Thus,
where an at-will employee was dismissed without cause, a misrepresentation
claim was sustained based upon an allegation that an employee was told
that as long as he substantially complied with the company's directions, he
would be employed until retirement and would receive the benefits of the
profit sharing, pension, and savings plans.'
Another potential problem area for employers is the content of employ-
ment manuals. Although an Illinois appellate court declined to construe a
personnel manual as binding against the employer in Sargent v. Illinois In-
stitute of Technology,92 the Michigan Supreme Court in Toussaint v. Blue
Cross & Blue Shield"' held that a legally enforceable promise could arise
from statements made at the time of hire or statements contained in an
employee manual. The Toussaint court held that because the oral and written
policy statement created a "reasonable expectation" of job security on the
part of the employee, an enforceable contract not to terminate his employ-
ment without just cause was thereby created. 4 The Michigan court also in-
dicated that the obligation was enforceable regardless of whether the policy
manual was distributed during the pre-employment interview or whether the
employee learned of the existence of the policy after he was hired.9 Despite
the Sargent case, the significance of Toussaint should not be ignored by an
89. Id. at 597, 292 N.W.2d at 884. The employee was told at the time of his hiring that he
would be with the company as long as he did his iob.
90. See, e.g., Gilliland v. Allstate Ins. Co., 69 Ill. App. 3d 630, 388 N.E.2d 68 (1st Dist.
1979). In Gilliland, a discharged employee alleged breach of an oral contract of employment
until retirement, and further alleged fraudulent misrepresentation concerning the receipt of
profit sharing, pension, and savings plans. Although the contract claim was properly dismissed,
the appeal court upheld the viability of the misrepresentation claims. Id. at 634, 388 N.E.2d at
71. Thus, the plaintiff was effectively allowed to circumvent the terminable-at-will rule by
presenting a misrepresentation claim.
91. Id.
92. 78 Il. App. 3d 117, 397 N.E.2d 443 (1st Dist. 1979).
93. 408 Mich. 579, 613-15, 292 N.W.2d 880, 892 (1980). In a companion case, Ebling v.
Masco Corp., 408 Mich. 579, 292 N.W.2d 880 (1980), a violation was predicated on the indica-
tion made in the employment manual that employees were not terminated for just cause.
94. 408 Mich. 579, 613-15, 292 N.W. 2d 880, 892 (1980).
95. Id.
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Illinois employer and thus the employment-at-will concept should be em-
phasized in the manual itself. Otherwise the employer is taking the unaccep-
table risk that the manual may be construed as a contract or part of a con-
tract, and a cause of action for the at-will employee may lie. 6
Once employment commences, statements by supervisors concerning
salary, in certain circumstances, can establish an implied term of duration
thereby transforming an at-will employment into contractual employment
terminable only by just cause. In Grauer v. Valve & Primer Corp.,97 a
memo was sent to an employee clarifying the terms of the corporate
employer's earlier letter containing a salary contract. The memo guaranteed
the employee "a minimum of $22,500 in 1973. "9 Based upon the
employer's projected and actual business volume, this amount could only
accumulate if the employee remained in employment for a full year." Con-
sequently, the letter was held to infer an intent to contract for an annual
duration.' °
An implied term of duration also was found in Chambers v. John T.
Shayne & Co.,' ° ' where an employee brought an action for breach of an
oral contract which provided for employment for one year and an implied
renewal for the subsequent year. Continuation of employment into a subse-
quent year without entering into a new agreement was held to renew the
contract at the same rate of compensation." 2 In Buian v. J.L. Jacobs &
Co., 3 however, the Seventh Circuit held that a provision of an employ-
ment contract which stated that a scheduled assignment was to continue for
a period of eighteen months was merely an expectation. The provision was
insufficient to convert an at-will relationship into a contract of specific
duration, particularly where the contract specifically permitted the employee
to work for as long as he desired.' 4
A related question is whether the period of time upon which compensa-
tion is based constitutes an implied term of duration. The courts of some
states have held, for instance, that reference to an "annual salary" creates
an inference of employment for the term of a year. 0I Illinois courts, how-
96. The Sargent court distinguished its fact situation from Carter v. Kaskaskia Community
Action Agency, 24 I11. App. 3d 1056, 322 N.E.2d 574 (5th Dist. 1974), in which a personnel
manual was compiled by an employer and reviewed and accepted by employees. Mutuality and
consideration were furnished by continued work under the manual. The manual, adopted after
the plaintiff's employment, was considered a modification of the original at-will employment
"contract," and thus created a contract requiring cause before termination. Id. at 1059, 322
N.E.2d at 576.
97. 47 Il. App. 3d 152, 154-55, 361 N.E.2d 863, 865-66 (2d Dist. 1977).
98. Id. at 154, 361 N.E.2d at 865.
99. Id.
100. Id. at 155, 361 N.E.2d at 866.
101. 32 I11. App. 2d 16, 176 N.E.2d 645 (1st Dist. 1961).
102. Id. at 25, 176 N.E.2d at 649.
103. 428 F.2d 531 (7th Cir. 1970) (applying Illinois law).
104. Id. at 533.
105. For a discussion of implied promises of duration in other jurisdictions, see Job Security,
supra note 32, at 703-34; Protecting At Will Employees, supra note 2, at 1820-21.
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ever, have consistently held that if a period of employment is not stated,
employment is at-will.' 6 Terms and conditions of employment, however,
should be discussed delicately. Most organizations would benefit from a
centralized personnel department where discussion of terms and conditions
may be more readily controlled.
One final point should be raised regarding the impact of salary structures
on the employment-at-will doctrine. If the employer intends to make re-
newal commission payments to sales employees so that the employee who
originally made the sale will earn additional future income for past work
performed,' 7 the employer should address this issue on the job application
form. A waiver is suggested in which the employee agrees that, in the event
he or she is terminated for any reason, the employee will agree to waive any
claims to future renewal commissions. Although this issue has not yet arisen
in Illinois, the Massachusetts Supreme Judicial Court addressed this problem
in Gram v. Liberty Mutual Insurance Company.' °8 Gram was an insurance
salesman who was terminated without cause, but not for an improper
motive. The court ruled that the employee was terminable-at-will and, thus,
not entitled to any additional income for future work. Because the
employee was not discharged for cause, however, he was entitled to his
renewal commissions which constituted future income for business originally
sold by him which was renewed after he left the company. Indeed, the court
held that where an employee-at-will is terminated without cause, he or she
is entitled to all future income for past work performed, up to the date of
the employee's retirement.' 9 This decision, if followed in Illinois, could
create serious liability to those employers who do not anticipate the prob-
lem.
The above considerations are aimed at ensuring that, where applicable,
both parties understand that employment is at-will before employment
begins and throughout the employment relationship. Once the possibility of
termination arises, the employer's focus must be redirected. Specifically, the
106. See, e.g., Bethany Reformed Church of Lynwood v. Hager, 84 Ill. App. 3d 684, 687,
406 N.E.2d 93, 95 (1st Dist. 1980) (as a matter of law in Illinois, hiring on basis of yearly
salary is terminable at will if no period of employment is stated); Atwood v. Curtiss Candy
Co., 22 IlI. App. 2d 369, 373, 161 N.E.2d 355, 357 (lst Dist. 1959) ("in this state the rule has
long been established that ... a monthly or annual salary, if no period of duration is specified
in the contract, is presumed to be at will . . .").
107. In the insurance industry, for example, employers often pay insurance sales agents
commissions on the sale of a policy and another commission each time the policy is renewed.
Because the renewal is usually automatic, at least one court has viewed the renewal commission
to be additional future income for past performance. See Gram v. Liberty Mut. Ins. Co.,
__ Mass. __, 429 N.E.2d 21 (1981).
108. Id.
109. Id. at __, 429 N.E.2d at 29. The court recognized that some future work may be
needed to retain Gram's renewal commissions. The court held, therefore, that the amount of
money paid to Gram for his renewals would be lessened by an appropriate amount to compen-
sate Liberty Mutual Insurance Company for the amount of time spent by the agents maintain-
ing Gram's renewal accounts. Id.
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employer who is seeking the maximum protection from a lawsuit must
reasonably avoid conduct which might become actionable. Because the re-
percussions of a wrongful discharge can be expensive, it is advisable for
employers to design an internal review procedure to protect against ill-
advised terminations by first-line management. Although employers
understandably have strong feelings concerning their right to terminate at-
will employees at their sole discretion, such emotions cannot play a part in
employment decisions which, through adverse litigation, can detrimentally
affect the employer's best business interests. Instead, an objective examina-
tion of every discharge decision is imperative so that an employer is fully
aware of the risks involved when making such a decision.
The core purpose of an internal review procedure is to avoid litigating
cases which cannot be won. To achieve this purpose, the employer's agent
charged with review responsibility must be aware of what actions con-
travene public policy. As previously discussed, Illinois statutes often ex-
pressly enunciate those actions which violate public policy."10 Although an
employer cannot be expected to know all the areas of potential liability,
counsel for employers should keep their clients sufficiently aware of the
legal trends in Illinois and in other states."' An employer should be suffi-
ciently sensitized to the problem to engage in intelligent decision-making or
to at least know when to seek legal assistance.'2
Whatever the real reason for discharge, the internal review procedure
must assess all circumstances surrounding the discharge to ensure that no
actionable retaliation is lurking in the shadows. For instance, the front-line
supervisor who recommended the discharge may know that a particular
employee has just reported some allegedly unlawful activity at the plant to
law enforcement authorities. In such an instance, the employer's agent who
is responsible for reviewing discharges must be permitted to investigate and
determine such facts. Otherwise, summary discharge of that employee, even
though he is employed at-will, may involve the potential for employer
liability. '' 
110. See supra notes 33-37, 39-44 & 48 and accompanying text.
11. In sensitizing an employer to potential liability, a practitioner should not only inform
the employer of the situations already recognized as actionable in Illinois. Emasculation of the
at-will rule is an ongo;ing process. To avoid undue litigation expense and possible compen-
satory and punitive liability, an employer must recognize the possibility that the public policy
tort will expand. The employer, therefore, should be made aware of the trends in other states
and pattern his behavior accordingly. See supra note 24 and accompanying text.
112. As in any business decision, practicalities will play a large role in deciding whether to
discharge an employee who may have a cause of action. For example, even though an
employee may have a cause of action, discharge may be worth the risk of suit if his presence in
the work force is disruptive. The willingness of an employer to take a risk of suit should vary
with his or her evaluation of the dangers posed by retaining the employee. It is important,
however, that this risk be factored into the decision-making process.
113. The type of proof in this situation could be analogous to that in discrimination cases
before the National Labor Relations Board. The Board recently spoke of the "dual motive"
issue in a decision upheld by a federal court of appeals. See NLRB v. Wright Line, 662 F.2d
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Design of an internal review procedure is, of course, a matter of in-
dividual concern. If the relevant legal principles are known, small businesses
can quickly and easily assimilate all the circumstances surrounding an
employee's discharge and may choose an informal review system. Because
larger operations have a deeper pocket and a greater potential for factual
complexity, some method of formal review for termination decisions should
be instituted.""
The Plaintiff's Case
There are several bases upon which a suit for the terminated at-will
employee may be brought. Initially, a plaintiff's counsel should examine
statutory authority fully prior to pleading to determine if a suit is expressly
permitted by the statute for four reasons. First, recovery is more likely if
the plaintiff can cite to a statute expressly covering the subject matter.'"
899 (1st Cir. 1981). Under the dual motive doctrine, the plaintiff's counsel must make a prima
facie showing sufficient to support the inference that protected conduct was a "motivating fac-
tor" in the employer's decision. Once this is established, the employer must show that the
same action would have occurred even in the absence of the protected conduct. This approach
was based on the two-part test used by the Supreme Court in Mount Healthy School Dist. v.
Doyle, 429 U.S. 274 (1977). In Mount Healthy, a school teacher alleged that his rights under
the first and fourth amendments had been violated when he was discharged for relating the
substance of a school memorandum to a radio station. The Supreme Court ruled that the
school board had to be given the opportunity to demonstrate that the teacher's contract would
not have been renewed regardless of the protected activity. Id. at 287.
The same standard was recently applied by the Court of Appeals for the Seventh Circuit. An
employer was found to have met its burden under the Wright Line test by showing that the
employee would have been discharged even in the absence of her protected conduct. Peavy Co.
v. NLRB, 648 F.2d 460 (7th Cir. 1981).
Similarly, to establish a prima facie case under the Age Discrimination in Employment Act
of 1967, 29 U.S.C. §§ 621-634 (1976 & Supp. III 1979), an employee must prove he was in a
protected age group, that his job met his employer's expectations, that he was fired, and that
the employer sought to replace the discharged employee with a younger person. See Harpring
v. Continental Oil Co., 628 F.2d 406 (5th Cir. 1980); Carolan v. Central Freight Lines, 489 F.
Supp. 941 (E.D. Tex. 1980). If the above factors are present, albeit fortuitously, the employer
is not, in the practical sense, at will to fire the employee. Despite the at-will doctrine, a tem-
porary just cause requirement is added to the relationship in this situation because the
employer will have to rebut the prima facie case of age discrimination with evidence of just
cause for discharge. See Moorehouse v. Boeing Co., 501 F. Supp. 390 (E.D. Pa.), aff'd, 639
F.2d 774 (3d Cir. 1980).
114. It should be noted that such a system may, however, have an affect on the imposition
of punitive damages. If the discharge is found to be retaliatory and in contravention of a clear
public policy, and if such discharge occurred after review by an internal monitoring of
discharge decisions, the basis for imposition of punitive damages may be greater than without
review by management. Such discharge might be seen as a knowing disregard of public policy,
whereas discharge by a supervisor without review might be viewed as negligence. Because
punitive damages generally are associated with knowing and willful acts, award of these
damages would be more justifiable where the decision to discharge was made or affirmed by
those in a position to know what constituted a violation of public policy.
115. For example, in the majority of cases, a unionized worker who was wrongfully
discharged could cite to the terms of collective bargaining agreements for support. See Na-
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Second, because courts are hesitant to expand exceptions to common law
doctrine, they tend to look for remedies which would not entail major
changes in the law."16 Third, an action may be limited to the statutorily
defined procedure. Failure to use this procedure may bar the plaintiff's
claim." 7 Finally, if thorough examination reveals no statutory violation, the
plaintiff can assert to his advantage that no remedy other than expansion of
the public policy tort exists, and that failure to grant relief will deny him
recovery for a clearly egregious wrong.
The plaintiff also should assert a breach of contract claim whenever
possible." 8 For instance, the plaintiff should file a claim stating that the
employment manual, job application, or employer representations indicated
a durational term of employment or a requirement of just cause for ter-
mination. " I "
In being consistent with the Illinois practice of alternative pleading, or if
no statutory or contractual remedy is available, the plaintiff should direct
his claim to the sphere of public policy. As previously mentioned, examina-
tion of statutory authority is important. Public policy has been limited to
expressions of the Illinois Constitution and statutes or expressions of the
courts when the constitution and statutes are silent.' 20 Consequently, the
tional Labor Relations Act, 29 U.S.C. §§ 151-168 (1976). See generally Job Security, supra
note 32, at 707 n.578.
Statutory provisions permitting recovery for wrongful discharge can be found in several
other areas of federal legislation. See, e.g., Veterans Preference Act, 5 U.S.C. § 2108 (1976);
Consumer Credit Protection Act, 15 U.S.C. § 1674(a) (1976); Labor-Management Relations
Act, 29 U.S.C. § 158(a) (1976); Fair Labor Standards Act of 1938, 29 U.S.C. § 215(a)(3)
(1976); Age Discrimination in Employment Act of 1967, 29 U.S.C. §§ 621-634 (1976 & Supp.
III 1979). See generally Peck, Unjust Discharges From Employment: A Necessary Change in
the Law, 40 OHIO ST. L.J. 1, 13-17 (1979).
In addition, if the plaintiff is a member of a minority group, suit should be brought under
Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964, 42 U.S.C. §§ 2000e-2(a) to 2(d), under the Illinois
Human Rights Act of 1980, ILL. REv. STAT. ch. 68, §§ 1-101 to 9-102 (1981), and under article
I, § 17 of the Illinois Constitution. See supra notes 27, 38 & 42 and accompanying text. The
first two provisions require the employee initially to submit his or her charge to an administra-
tive body. Section 17, however, permits immediate access to the courts and, unlike the other
two statutes, permits punitive damages in addition to compensatory damages.
For individual state listings on state legislation pertinent to wrongful discharge, see [State
Law] LAB. L. REP. (CCH) 43,045, 43,055. See also supra notes 39-44 and accompanying
text (outlining Illinois' statutory provisions for relief of wrongful discharge).
116. See Teale v. Sears, Roebuck & Co., 66 II1. 2d 1, 359 N.E.2d 473 (1977). In Teale, the
plaintiff asserted an implied right to a civil action under the Age Discrimination Act, § 4, 1967
Ill. Laws 2044, repealed by Illinois Human Rights Act, P.A. 81-1216, § 10-108, 1979 II1. Laws
4854. The court examined other statutes which expressly provided for civil remedies and ab-
stained from inferring a remedy under the Age Discrimination Act. 66 Ill. 2d at 5-6, 359
N.E.2d at 474-75.
117. See infra notes 142-43 and accompanying text.
118. See supra notes 59-67 and accompanying text.
119. See, e.g., Toussaint v. Blue Cross & Blue Shield, 408 Mich. 579, 292 N.W.2d 880
(1980) (legally enforceable promise can be based on statements contained in employment
manual). See also supra notes 89-104 and accompanying text.
120. See supra notes 46-56 and accompanying text.
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plaintiff should attempt to extract public policy from these sources. Indeed,
the genesis of the public policy tort in Illinois has depended upon the laws
of the state. The Leach court implied a private right of action from a
statutory proscription of interference with rights under the Workers' Com-
pensation Act. 2 ' The decision in Kelsay was based on an implied public
policy derived from the purpose behind the Act,'22 and the Palmateer court
found public policy inherent in a body of law, the Illinois criminal code.'23
Any connection with constitutional or statutory authority will help justify
the link between established law and any proposed extension of that law.
Public policy also may be derived from judicial decisions which have
recognized various public policies as a basis for a cause of action in
retaliatory discharge. Because of the developing nature of the tort, the
plaintiff should look to other jurisdictions for public policy support of his
claim. 2 ' In addition to the recognized claim for discharge in retaliation for
filing a workers' compensation claim'25 and for discharge in retaliation for
aiding law enforcement officials with respect to another employee's possible
violation of the criminal code,' 26 any of the following discharges are poten-
tially actionable in Illinois: discharge in retaliation for efforts to ensure
compliance of a company's product with labeling and licensing statutes;127
discharge in retaliation for uncovering corporate malfeasance;' 28 discharge
in retaliation for an employee's refusal to commit perjury;'29 discharge in
retaliation for an employee's serving on a jury;' 30 and discharge in retalia-
tion for an employee's efforts to ensure a company's compliance with con-
sumer credit laws.'
3
'
Additionally, even if a colorable claim cannot be derived from implied
contractual representations made to the discharged employee, the plaintiff
should include a misrepresentation claim in his complaint.' 32 Although
121. See supra notes 46-51 and accompanying text.
122. See supra notes 52-53 and accompanying text.
123. See supra notes 54-56 and accompanying text.
124. Courts recognizing retaliatory discharge as actionable under the public policy rationale
uniformly look to other jurisidictions for guidance and support. See supra note 80 and accom-
panying text. Therefore, it behooves the plaintiff to bring to the court's attention similar fac-
tual situations and the policy decisions from jurisdictions recognizing the tort.
125. See Kelsay v. Motorola Co., 74 Ill. 2d 172, 384 N.E.2d 353 (1978).
126. See Palmateer v. International Harvester Co., 85 I11. 2d 124, 421 N.E.2d 876 (1981).
127. See Sheets v. Teddy's Frosted Foods, Inc., 179 Conn. 471, 427 A.2d 385 (1980).
128. See Adler v. American Standard Corp., 290 Md. 615, 432 A.2d 464 (1981).
129. See Petermann v. International Bhd. of Teamsters Local 396, 174 Cal. App. 2d 184,
344 P.2d 25 (1959).
130. See Nees v. Hocks, 272 Or. 210, 536 P.2d 572 (1975).
131. See Harless v. First Nat'l Bank, 246 S.E.2d 270 (W. Va. 1978).
132. The court in Soules v. General Motors Corp., 79 Ill. 2d 282, 402 N.E.2d 599 (1980),
articulated the cause of action as follows:
As disclosed by decisions of this court, the elements of a cause of action for
fraudulent misrepresentation (sometimes referred to as "fraud and deceit" or
"deceit") are (1) false statements of material fact; (2) known or believed to be
false by the party making it; (3) intent to induce the other party to act; (4) action
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misrepresentation may be difficult to establish, '33 such a claim may provide
a remedy where no statutory, contractual, or public policy violation can be
shown.'34 Thus, the circumstances surrounding the employment process
must be scrutinized.
Finally, the claim emanating from the Massachusetts Supreme Judicial
Court in Gram v. Liberty Mutual Insurance Co.'3 should be recognized in
the event that any future income is attributable to past work. From a plain-
tiff's standpoint, this claim should be particularly attractive because it
applied to employees who are admittedly terminable at-will, but whose ter-
mination is not based upon just cause. No showing of actual malice or
violation of public policy is necessary to recover. As a result, this claim
may be the easiest to prove, where applicable, assuming that Illinois courts
are willing to adopt the theory.
The Defendant's Case
Once litigation has commenced, the defendant should first concentrate on
the procedural grounds which can be pleaded to defeat the plaintiff's claim.
Defenses such as statutes of limitations, the statute of frauds, laches, and
failure to state a claim upon which relief can be granted should all be raised.
by the other party in reliance on the truth of the statement; and (5) damage to the
other party resulting from such reliance. Furthermore, the reliance by the other
must be justified, i.e., he must have had a right to rely.
Id. at 286, 402 N.E.2d at 601 (citations omitted).
133. The plaintiff must, for instance, establish his justifiable reliance on the misrepresenta-
tions of his employer. The appropriate inquiry as to justifiable reliance is whether, under all
the circumstances, plaintiff had a right to rely on the false representations. "This question is to
be answered while viewing the representation in light of all the facts of which plaintiff had
knowledge as well as those of which he 'might have availed himself by the exercise of just
prudence.' " Id. Many cases stand for the principle that a cause of action for misrepresenta-
tion will lie only if the parties do not have equal knowledge or means of acquiring knowledge
of the facts represented. See, e.g., Peterson Indus. v. Lake View Trust & Sav. Bank, 584 F.2d
166 (7th Cir. 1978) (reliance upon letter from bank not justified where plaintiff knew of
depleted funds); Goetz v. Avildsen Tool & Machs. Inc., 82 Ill. App. 3d 1054, 403 N.E.2d 555
(1st Dist. 1980) (reliance not justified because plaintiff "investigated" through an attorney);
Kuska v. Folkes, 73 Ill. App. 3d 540, 391 N.E.2d 1082 (2d Dist. 1979) (purchaser of house
chargeable with notice of defect of which their attorney was aware); Costello v. Liberty Mut.
Ins. Co., 38 II1. App. 3d 503, 348 N.E.2d 254 (1st Dist. 1976) (reliance not justified because
plaintiff waived his rights to retirement benefits).
134. From a plaintiff's perspective, it is astonishing that misrepresentation suits are not filed
more often. It is rare that an employer does not tell'an employee at some point that the
employee may work for the employer as long as he continues to perform well. Such a state-
ment, however, transforms the employee from an at-will employee to one who has a cause of
action if he is discharged without cause. See Gilliland v. Allstate Ins. Co., 69 Ill. App. 3d 630,
388 N.E.2d 68 (1st Dist. 1978). For a discussion of Gilliland, see supra note 89. Further, the
misrepresentation claim is applicable even in the absence of a contract or public policy viola-
tion and can be based on statements dating far back in time. The statute of limitations on a
misrepresentation claim starts from the date of discovery and not from the date that the
misrepresentation was made.
135. __ Mass. .. 429 N.E.2d 21 (1981). See supra notes 106-08 and accompanying
text.
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Regarding the statute of limitations, the defendant may find that an
employee-plaintiff has not properly read the statute, and therefore the claim
is time barred. This is particularly true where the thrust of a plaintiff's
claims are based primarily in tort under a public policy theory. If the claim
can be characterized as a personal injury or tort, a two year statute of
limitations applies.' 3 6 Otherwise, a five year limitation period applies to all
actions not covered by a specific statute of limitations. '
The statute of frauds also can be helpful if an oral employment contract
is involved. Although a statute of frauds defense would appear obvious, its
use can be overlooked. A defense of laches also may be utilized to limit or
negate liability.
Finally, a motion to dismiss for failure to state a claim upon which relief
can be granted can be used as an effective defense against the public policy
claim. There are several ways that this defense can work to the defendant's
benefit. First, in the case of a claim for retaliatory discharge based upon
public policies not yet specifically recognized in Illinois courts, a claim for
relief should be attacked by pointing out that Illinois does not have such a
public policy. The defendant also may argue that economic considerations
militate against curtailing business freedom. Justice Ryan's dissent in
Palmateer voiced this very concern about the adverse effect of a liberal ap-
plication of the public policy exception.' 38 Courts of other states similarly
have noted that economic factors should restrict undue expansion of the
tort. 3 9
Similarly, it may be advantageous for a defendant to discuss the impact
of derogation of the at-will rule upon small employers." ' The federal
136. ILL. REV. STAT. ch. 110, § '13-202 (1981) (effective July 1, 1982). A ten year statute of
limitations, however, applies to written contracts. Id. § 17.
137. Id., § 13-205.
138. Justice Ryan stated:
The deteriorating business climate in this State is a topic of substantial interest. A
general discussion of that subject is not appropriate to this dissent. It must be
acknowledged, however, that Illinois is not attracting a great amount of new in-
dustry and business and that industries are leaving the State at a troublesome rate.
I do not believe that this court should further contribute to the declining business
environment by creating a vague concept of public policy which will permit an
employer to discharge an unwanted employee, one who could be completely
disruptive of labor-management relations through his police spying and citizen
crime-fighter activities, only at the risk of being sued in tort not only for compen-
satory damages, but also for punitive damages.
Palmateer v. International Harvester Co., 85 Ill. 2d 124, 143, 421 N.E.2d 876, 885 (1981)
(Ryan, J., dissenting). See supra notes 13-17 and accompanying text.
139. 85 I11. 2d at 144, 421 N.E.2d at 885. Justice Ryan quoted decisions from other states
which tended to restrict expansion of the public policy exception for economic reasons.
Professor Blades, while promoting an expansion of an employee's right to sue his employer
for wrongful discharge, recognized the adverse effect of such litigation on the employer's
business. See supra note 17.
140. It has been suggested that the original purpose of the at-will rule was to foster "self-
reliance and economic individualism," and that it was no longer valid in the present economic
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government has indicated its interest in affording small employers discretion
in structuring their employment relationships."' Modification of the at-will
rule will have a greater impact on small employers because they are often
less unionized or structured than larger companies and their employees are
more often terminable at-will. Additionally, small employers are less able to
afford the costs of litigating individual termination decisions and to pay
resultant damages. Thus, the ironic effect of expanding the tort would be
greater restrictions on the employment practices of the very class of
employers which Congress intended to accord broader discretion.
If a public policy is alleged to be inherent in a statute, a defendant can
argue that the appropriate remedies were included in the statute by the
legislature and that a cause of action for retaliatory discharge was con-
sidered and rejected as part of the legislative process. This follows the
reasoning of the Illinois Supreme Court in Teale v. Sears, Roebuck & Co." 2
The Teale court declined to imply a civil right of action because other
statutes expressly provided causes of action while the statute in question did
not. The court reasoned that the legislature expressly would have provided a
remedy if it had intended that one exist.'
4 3
If the procedural roadblocks fail, the defendant will have to prove that
the employee was discharged for just cause. For example, the defendant
would have to show that the contravened public policy alleged as the reason
for discharge was not, in fact, the employer's reason for discharging the
employee." 4 The defendant must establish that the alleged retaliation occur-
red for permissible business reasons, rather than through retaliatory intent,
and that the discharge would have occurred despite public policy considera-
tions.
CONCLUSION
The doctrine of employment-at-will continually has been eroded as Illinois
courts increasingly have employed the tort of retalitatory discharge. To
avoid potential liability, an employer who maintains a practice of hiring at-
will employees should expressly state that the employment is at-will in the
context of large corporate employers. Protecting At Will Employees, supra note 2, at 1826. To
small employers, however, those principles of laissez-faire economics remain relevant.
141. Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964, 42 U.S.C. § 2000e(b) (1976), exempts small
employers from its sanctions. The policies behind employment discrimination are deserving of
universal application; however, to afford maximum protection to small employers, the
legislature chose to exempt them. It would be inconsistent with that policy to substantially limit
the discretion given these small employers by expanding the public policy exceptions.
142. 66 Ill. 2d 1, 359 N.E.2d 473 (1977).
143. Id. at 6, 359 N.E.2d at 475.
144. See supra note 113 and accompanying text. In Texas Dept. of Community Affairs v.
Burdine, 450 U.S. 248 (1981), the Supreme Court held that in a Title VII employment
discrimination case the defendant can rebut the plaintiff's prima facie case only by proving, by
a preponderance of the evidence, the existence of legitimate, nondiscriminatory reasons for the
employment action. 1d. at 254-56.
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job application, in the employee manual, and in representations made dur-
ing initial interviewing. In addition, the employer should scrutinize the ter-
mination procedures to ensure that no actual retaliation exists. An employee
suing for a wrongful discharge should incorporate in his complaint any
possible cause of action which can be derived from the Illinois Constitution,
Illinois statutes, or from case law. In drafting his pleading, the employee
also should include a misrepresentation count, a count for breach of con-
tract, and a count demanding future income for past services whenever
possible.
Although these practical guidelines do not provide precise definitions,
arguments, and procedures, they are intended to aid the practitioner in con-
ceptualizing a framework of thought to effectively use the new public policy
tort of retaliatory discharge in the proper context. The arguments on both
sides are ripe for expansion and will grow and change in correlation with
developments in the public policy tort across the country. Any concept as
ambiguous as public policy necessarily involves results of uncertain predic-
tability. Such a volatile situation must be approached with great caution
and preparation by the employer, upon whom the axe may fall in the form
of punitive damages. Correspondingly, the plaintiff should take heed of the
trend to expand the tort and strive to carve out new areas of policy.
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